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his issue of EAP begins our 17th year. We thank
the 73 readers who have renewed their subscriptions and include reminders for “delinquents.”
We include two feature essays this issue, the
first of which, by philosopher Dylan Trigg, explores
the relationship between memory and place, using
the coffee-house chain Starbucks as a context for
discussion. Second, psychologist Chris Aanstoos
examines phenomenologically the process of designing his own “dream house” in a Georgia forest.
These two essays—one conceptual and philosophical, the other experiential and grounded in
firsthand will and need—illustrate the wide range of
phenomenological perspectives and methods.

Phenomenology Conferences
The annual meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) and the
Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences (SPHS) will be held 12-15 October 2006 in
Philadelphia. The meetings are sponsored by Villanova University. www.spep.org. In conjunction with
SPEP and HPHS, the annual meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) will be held 14-16 October. Contact:
scameron@lmu.edu.
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IAEP Session on “Nature of Order”
During the 2005 business meeting at last year’s
IAEP conference in Salt Lake City, officers proposed that IAEP (see above), in conjunction with
other “environmental” groups, would co-sponsor
paper sessions all day Monday, 16 October.
Representing EAP, David Seamon and Canadian graduate student Tim Quick have agreed to organize a double session on architect Christopher
Alexander’s four-volume The Nature of Order,
which we have highlighted regularly in EAP. Presentation topics may focus on any aspect of Order,
whether more conceptual and philosophical or more
design-oriented and related to architectural practice.
If any EAP readers would like to present a paper in these special sessions, please contact David
Seamon as soon as possible: triad@ksu.edu.
Below: Drawings from Stephen A. Mouzon’s Traditional Construction Patterns, a book that identifies central elements that make good traditional architecture—
“patterns,” as Mouzon calls them (see p. 4).
These drawings refer to Mouzon’s first pattern,
simplicity of massing: “The root of nearly all traditional
architectural massing is simplicity. Go back to the buildings that are the foundation of almost any style, and you
will find a simple volume or an assembly of
simple volumes.”
In regard to the two houses shown
here, Mouzon says: “Don’t use complicated
forms…. [Instead], keep massing simple.
Composing a house of one or a few simple
boxes saves tremendous amounts of money
for more effective things like proper porch
detailing, back porches, garden walls, frontage fences, [and] pergolas…that help the
owners enjoy inhabiting all of their property.”
1
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Donors, 2006

submitted to conference organizer Barbro Giorgi at
bgiorgi@jfku.edu. For the current IHS newsletter,
go to: www.seattleu.edu/artsci/psychology/ihsr-05.htm.

We are grateful to the following readers who have
contributed more than the base subscription for
2006. As always, we could not continue without
your generous support, and we thank you all!
David Adams
Alfred Bay
Carol Cantrell
Clare Cooper Marcus
Tom Erickson
Kirk Gastinger
Rich Haydn
David Kermani
Karen Kho
Anne Niemiec
Susan Mazur-Stommen
Miles Richardson
Douglas Patterson
Mark Rosenbaum
Tom Saarinen
Silke Schilling
Harvey Sherman
Eva Simms
Karen Steinmayer
Sandra Vitzthum

The 24th annual symposium of the Simon
Silverman Phenomenology Center will focus on
“Paul Ricoeur and Phenomenology” and be held 1718 March at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh.
Keynote speakers include Mory Joy, David Pellauer, Lenore Langsdorf, and Peter Kemp. Contact:
Dan Martino, Director, Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, at: martino@duq.edu..

Tom Barrie
Margaret Boschetti
Linda Carson
Ryan Drum
L. J. Evenden
Marie Gee
Michael Kazanjan
Patricia Locke
Ted Lowitz
Claudia Mausner
Robert Mugerauer
Leanne Rivlin
Kim Rollings
Hanalei Rozen
Peter Sauer
Gwendolyn Scott
John Sherry, Jr.
Charlene Spretnak
Karen Vitulano
Justin Winkler

The conference, “Senses of Place: Exploring Concepts and Expressions of Place through Different
Senses and Lenses,” will be held in Hobart, Tasmania, 6-8 April 2006 and is co-sponsored by the
University of Hobart’s Place Research Network.
www.utas.edu.au/placenet/senses.
The conference Writing on the Land: John
Burroughs and His Legacy, will be held 11-15
June 2006 at the State University of New York at
Oneonta. The focus is on nature writers who, like
Catskill regionalist John Burroughs, are linked
closely to a particular landscape or place. Topics
of interest include: regional novelists, literary environmentalists, and sense of place in literature.
Abstracts are due by March 30. Contact Prof.
Daniel Payne at: paynedg@oneonta.edu.

Items of Interest

The 25th annual International Human Sciences
conference will be held 3-6 August 2006 at the
John F. Kennedy University in Pleasant Hills, California. The conference theme is “The Multicultural
Future of Qualitative Research,” though all proposal
topics will be considered.
The theme description reads in part: “An inherent problem of research in the human sciences is
understanding human beings with their infinite
complexity and diversity in ways that can somehow
yield knowledge that is to some degree generalizable without being reductionistic. This challenge of
honoring diversity while also organizing around
some necessary commonality is an increasingly important issue in most, if not all, societies.”
This group has continued to be interested in
environmental and architectural aspects of human
life, and EAP readers are encouraged to participate.
Paper abstracts are due 1 March and should be

The Nature Institute will sponsor programs and
seminars on Goethean science this spring and
summer, including a full-time immersion course, 2
April-June 16. www.natureinstitute.org.

News from Readers
Sean M. Conrey is currently a Ph.D candidate in
rhetoric and composition at Purdue University. He
is working on a dissertation entitled “Coming to
Terms with Place: A Phenomenological Technique of Rhetorical Placemaking.” This work demonstrates how “coming to terms” with the places
in which we live is a crucial aspect of settling into
place. Conrey seeks to derive a rhetorical technique for helping this “coming to terms” happen.
conreys@purdue.edu.
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“A homecoming is a return from chaos to cosmos, a recognition and an embrace of the center of a
universe. Here home is imagined as the metaphorical product of the fertilizing male volcano and the
fruitful female earth. The center of a home is the
hearth, as circle of fire or point of flame. A significant shift in orientation occurs in Earthdome, since
the notional hearth, as central source of ambient
warmth and cooking heat, is in the crust of the Earth
itself.
“Sometimes it takes only a small shift to reorient one’s whole relationship to home and through
home to the universe. From the outside, to the casual passerby on the street, Earthdome looks good,
but it does not shout, “Hey, look at me, I’m really
different!” It is, quite simply, the house next door to
a boyhood home, but radically transformed from the
inside out—something like a man coming back
wearing the same coat he left home in, many years
ago.” rhonechristine@hotmail.com.

Writer and artist Christine Rhone sends the following from London: “The House of Commons was
the setting for the recent presentation of a prestigious Green Apple Environment Award to Earthdome, a residential development in the London suburb of Norbury and the first to have geothermal hot
water and heating. Earthdome is a set of four apartments in two new semi-detached houses, located in
a street of similar houses designed in the 1930s.
“The street has a comfortable feeling about it,
relaxed and leafy. Earthdome is different from the
other houses in the street, but it does not jar. A casual passerby might not even notice anything special
about it. Yes, here the windows are bigger than in
the other houses, but not so much that they call attention to themselves. Here the decorative tiles on
the façade are almost the same, only slightly rearranged to accord with the proportions of the Golden
Section of sacred geometry. Here the rendering of
the exterior looks rather similar, but it is mixed with
volcanic ash and minerals, and for more than practical reasons. The volcanic elements symbolize the
father covering and protecting the mother and
home.
“Earthdome features geothermal heating, which
is the most energy efficient, environmentally clean
and cost-effective. Heat is moved from 40 feet below the Earth’s surface into the building through a
system of pipes and pumps.
“All hot water is heated geothermally. Bathtubs
are encased in resins blended with quartz crystal.
Sinks and toilets are covered with a subtle silver
glaze, enhancing the properties of water. All skirting
and most angles are rounded. Cornices help modulate the sound properties of spaces. Staircases spiral
up and down in a series of recyclable units. French
doors open wide for easy changes of air.
“Floors are covered with porcelain tiles containing quartz. Rugs soften under footsteps rather
than dust-clinging carpets. Electrical wiring is
shielded. Much of the lighting has on-off sensors
for energy efficiency. The whole electrical field
around beds can be completely switched off for
sounder sleep. And up in the topmost bedrooms,
blue floor lighting suggests a mood of peace, while
the skylights give views of the horizon and the
clouds.

Fran Violich
Francis Violich, professor emeritus in city and regional planning and in landscape architecture at the
University of California, Berkeley, died 21 August
2005, of natural causes at his home in Berkeley. He
was 94.
Since EAP was founded in 1990, Violich was
one of its staunchest supporters (see his “Dalmatia,
Urban Identity and the War, 1991—1993,” in the
fall 1993 issue). We will miss his encouragement,
networking, and creative insights in recognizing the
considerable contribution that phenomenological
understanding can offer urban place making.
Memorial contributions can be made to the
Francis Violich Dalmatian Fellowship Fund. c/o UC
Berkeley's Department of City and Regional Planning, 228 Wurster Hall, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

Citations Received
Chris Allen, 2004. Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology
and the Body-in-Space: Encounters of Visually Impaired Children, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 22: 719-35.
This sociologist develops “a phenomenology of visually impaired childrens’ everyday body-in-space encounters with
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their home and urban environments.” A major focus is “the
various and creative ways in which visually impaired children
routinely exercise agency within their home and urban environments.”

Stephen Mouzon, 2005. Traditional Construction
Patterns. NY: McGraw-Hill.
This architect “explains, in layman’s terms, the vague sense of
unease we’ve all had with traditional architecture done incorrectly… and provides the tools for doing it right again.” Mouzon’s main tool is a set of 108 “patterns” illustrated as Do’s
and Don’t’s, for example, “simplicity of massing” (no. 1)
which argues that a building should be shaped as “a simple
volume or an assembly of simple volumes”; or “symmetry of
the face” (no. 4), which says that “all traditional architecture
reflects the bilateral symmetry of the human face in some way
at the entry of the building.” Includes drawings and wellchosen photographs; see the examples on p. 1.

Bruce V. Foltz & Robert Frodeman, eds., 2004. Rethinking Nature: Essays in Environmental Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
This collection of articles “brings the voices of leading Continental philosophers into discussion about what is emerging as
one of our most pressing and timely concerns—the environmental crisis facing our planet.” Contributors include David
Abram, Robert Mugerauer, and Ingrid Leman Stefanovic.

Juhani Pallasmaa, 2005. Encounters: Architectural
Essays. Helsinki: Rakennustieto.

Trish Glazebrook, 2003. Art or Nature: Aristotle,
Restoration Ecology, and Flowforms, Ethics & the
Environment, 8, (1): 1-36.

Twenty-five reprinted articles and book chapters all broadly
on “the phenomenology of architecture and architectural experience,” written over the last 25 years by Finnish architect
and architectural writer Juhani Pallasmaa. Includes such important essays as “Stairways of the Mind,” “Identity, Intimacy,
and Domicile,” “Hapticity and Time,” and “The Rooms of
Memory: Architecture in Painting.” Includes a 2004 interview
with Pallasmaa, conducted by architect Peter MacKeith. A
central text for “architectural phenomenology.”

Using the example of sculptor John Wilkes’ flowforms, this
philosopher argues that “ecologically-minded art can demonstrate how production of artifacts need not affirm a logic of
domination, but rather can open a space for an alternative conception of the human relation to nature.”

Tom Mels, ed., 2004. Reanimating Places: A Geography of Rhythms. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Christopher J. Preston, 2003. Grounding Knowledge: Environmental Philosophy, Epistemology, and
Place Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press.

Dedicated to geographer Anne Buttimer, this collection of 14
articles focuses on the links among lived experience, time,
space, and place. Editor Mels provides an introduction on the
“Lineages of a Geography of Rhythm,” and contributors include: Yi-Fu Tuan (“Sense of Place: Its Relationship to Self
and Time”); David Ley (“The Stranger’s Lifeworld”); Edward
Relph (“Temporality and the Rhythms of Sustainable Landscapes”); Gunnar Olsson (Placing the Holy”); Robert Sack
(“Place-Making and Time”); and David Seamon (“Grasping
the Dynamism of Urban Place: Contributions from the Work
of Christopher Alexander, Bill Hillier, and Daniel Kemmis”).

This philosopher argues that “the physical realities of the environments in which beliefs are formed are relevant to the ways
people know.” He seeks to demonstrate that “the very cognitive processes with which we contemplate our place in the
world are themselves derived from and wedded to our physical
locatedness. This claim entails that part of the feeling of attachment to place is quite literally an attachment of a portion
of our cognitive architecture to the lands we inhabit.”

Joy Monice Malnar & Frank Vodvarka, 2004. Sensory Design. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.

Nikos A. Salingoaros, 2004. Anti-Architecture and
Deconstruction. Germany: Umbau-Verlag.
A scathing, often “over-the-top,” attack of deconstructivist
architecture, and thoughts about design alternatives, mostly
focused on the work of Christopher Alexander. Many useful
ideas but marred by a frequent mean-spiritedness that interferes with central insights.

These authors argue that “a better understanding and appreciation of all our senses can contribute to a new typology for the
design of significant spaces, one that would sharply contrast
with the formal model that dominates architectural practice
today.” The result is said to be “a new philosophy of design
that celebrates our sensuous occupation of the built environment and creates more humane design.”
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Memories in Site: Toward a Renewed
Understanding of Starbucks
Dylan Trigg
Trigg is a research student at the University of Sussex. He is interested in marginal spaces such as hotel lobbies,
airports and supermarkets. He has also written on the aesthetics of decay and modern ruins. His current research
explores the idea of the built environment as a testimony to events of past destruction. His essay here is part of a
broader work that examines the role that homogenous ‘sites’ play in contributing to a memory-based theory of
personal identity. © 2006 Dylan Trigg. www.dylantrigg.com; dylantrigg@hotmail.com.

H

ow does space contain memories? The
question is hampered in that we lack a criterion that enables us to ascertain where
past memories end and unmediated experience begins. Pure experience eludes as the imagination creates spatial memories devoid of factual grounding.
Despite this apparent conflation between forms
of recollection, remembering an event necessarily
implicates the context in which that memory took
place. A placeless memory, as Edward Casey
(1987a pp. 183-84) notes, not only disallows memory to be situated accurately; it also prevents disorientation with regard to that memory.
Casey’s analysis of ‘place memory’ is insightful
and contentious. As with Gaston Bachelard, memorable space presupposes being intimate. This is a
claim that allows Casey to render place “congealed
scenes” for memory. As such, fulfilling Aristotle’s
original description of place as “the innermost motionless boundary of what contains,” Casey (p. 184)
is able to posit an idea of place as a place-holder of
memories, so securing spatial memories.
In the present essay, I wish to contest Casey’s
analysis of place memory. While intimate place is
often regarded as archetypal in its containment of
memory, the radical dichotomy between place and
non-place (principally in the form of ‘site’) means
that any such ambiguity between the two has been
neglected. Here, I wish to address this neglect and
in the process posit the memorable power of site.

W

*****

e can begin by examining how Casey
grounds his account of place memory. In this
way, an opening is provided to ascertain if spatial
memories are as secure as originally thought. Echoing Bachelard’s, Casey’s account of memory is
framed by a mistrust of temporal-centrism. Understanding time without reference to what is represented by time means there is no contrast against
which the measure of passing can be established.
“It is,” Casey writes in relation to the body,
“only when we notice discrepancies between such
states that we begin to infer the passage of time…”
(p. 182). The simple ‘pastness’ of memory fails to
acknowledge its entirety. Casey’s reply to this incompleteness is to consider how embodied memory
necessarily involves particularization:
To be embodied is ipso facto to assume a particular perspective and position... it is to occupy a portion of space from out
of which we undergo given experiences and remember them.
To be disembodied is not only to be deprived of place, unplaced; it is to be denied the basic stance on which every experience and its memory depend (ibid.).

This is an important passage that grounds Casey’s account. Memory necessarily individuates
events from other events by being specific. Thus,
recollection suspends other events selectively to allow a particular memory to transpire.
The specificity of this recollection means that
abstraction is negated. Remembering is seldom as
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boundary of what contains” (ibid.), the relationship
between a site and what occupies that site is detached, abstract and entirely devoid of intimacy. The
effects of this are that as a container of memories,
site falters. The “essentially empty” quality of the
site undermines any claim to being memorable: “A
site possesses no points of attachment onto which to
hang our memories, much less to retrieve them” (p.
184).
In contrast, place, “full of protuberant features
and forceful vectors” (p. 186), is distinct and able to
facilitate memorability. Through containing memories, place preserves them: “To be in a place is to be
sheltered and sustained by its containing boundary;
it is to be held within this boundary rather than to be
dispersed by an expanding horizon of time or to be
exposed indifferently in space” (ibid.).

vague as to evade a set of defined circumstances.
But this is not the case: even the most formless
memories submit to the category of being specific,
and an event which is specific necessarily defines
itself in time and space: “As embodied existence
opens onto place; indeed takes place in place and
nowhere else, so our memory of what we experience in place is likewise place-specific” (p. 182).
The ‘nowhere else’ of Casey’s remark reaffirms
the exclusive nature of memory and experience.
Freud’s comment that “the same space cannot have
two different contents” is repeated in Casey’s metaphysics of spatial memory where the particularization of memory instigates its unique embodiment.

U

*****

nfortunately for Casey, history has lost sight of
the way that place contains our memories.
Methods for remembrance have deviated from the
Greek art of memory. The implications for this are
more than a mere loss of tradition. In addition to
being subjugated by a concentration on time, place
has also been shadowed by a preoccupation with
what Casey terms ‘site’: “that is, place as leveled
down to metrically determinate dimensions” (p.
182). This division between place and site is essential, not least in relation to memory-based theories
of personal identity. As such, it warrants careful examination.
Much has changed,” writes Casey with some regret, “since the early Pythagorean Archytas declared
that place is ‘the first of all beings, since everything
that exists is in a place and cannot exist without a
place’” (p. 184).
Casey’s historical reading of place’s loss of emplacement is framed by a geometrization of space
and place that occurred during the 17th century.
Situating Greek thought against modern thought
(Newtown, Descartes, and Bernoulli), Casey suggests that geometrical space “was conceived as continuous extension in length, breadth, and width and,
thus, as mappable by the three-dimensional coordinate system of rational geometry” (ibid.). As a result
of this transition, place loses its “inhomogeneous
and anisotropic qualities” and instead “is conceived
as sheer spatial site” (p. 185).
Site, for Casey, is thus open. Against Aristotle’s
definition of place as “the innermost motionless

W

*****

ith the risk of dispersion present, we have
been united with Bachelard. Indeed, at stake
in both Casey and Bachelard are several assumptions that both bind and ground their theories simultaneously. Though phrased differently in Bachelard,
the distinction between site and place is elemental
for both thinkers.
In both cases, we observe a masterful working
of space and place in which intimacy and protection
are essential in the construction of memorable
place. Whereas Casey opposes place and site,
Bachelard forges a radical (and dialectical) distinction between inside and outside through which the
universe is said to press down upon the interiority
of the home.
For Casey, site has a negative quality in that indifference, emptiness, and outright geometrization
suppress the power of place. In Bachelardian terms,
such attributes contribute to the dispersion of the
potential dweller. Bachelard (1964, p. 47) writes: “A
house that has been experienced is not an inert box.
Inhabited space transcends geometrical space.” The
alignment of geometrical space with Casey’s site
affirms the lack of shelter between the two. Both
expand so that memories disperse as the absence of
place neglects to contain them.
Let us summarize: through lacking “variegations,” site offers no possibility of containing
memories. The lack of distinction in the site—literal
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Avoiding an indeterminate idiosyncrasy that
would harbor a discontinuity between individual
stores (though being careful not to sacrifice the impression of being inviting and moreover localized),1
Starbucks thus falls from a particularized distinctiveness and fulfils Casey’s definition of site as
“having no internal differentiations with respect to
material constitution” and so “leveled down to the
point of being definable solely in terms of distances
between ‘positions’ which are established on its surface and which exist strictly in relation to one another” (1987a, p. 185).
It is not “distinct potencies” that individuates
one Starbucks from another but rather the geometrical space that exists between them. That they are
often confused with one another only emphasizes
their essential vacuity and so reinforces their presence, not as a place, but as a site.

or otherwise—means that nothing in particular
stands out. Indeed, site is only transformed into a
place through the conferment of a distinctive thing
upon it, such as a house (1987a, p. 186). The presence of a house carves particularity from the homogenous and undefined. This is what we mean by
the term ‘intimacy’. Lived experience, so important
to both Casey and Bachelard, remedies the vacuity
of the site by enforcing a narrative upon it.
In turn, place becomes animated through becoming particular. A particular place has a discernable identity. Thus, the trust we have in the continuous familiarity of a place means that indifference
gives way to idiosyncrasy and character. Indeed,
character and intimacy, if not synonymous with one
another, remain inextricably bound.
We now must examine Casey’s argument critically. In the first instance, intimate space is said to
be conducive to the emplacement of memory, since
intimacy distinguishes itself from the supposed homogeneity of the site. Yet, this simple dichotomy
between the place that contains and the site that disperses precludes an ambiguity between the two.
Indeed, in a later essay, Casey goes so far as to
describe site rather self-consciously as the “antiplace dancing on the abyss of no-place” (1997, pp.
267-96). Thus, that site itself might afford a sense of
intimacy is not possible in accordance with Bachelard and Casey’s logic.

B

S

*****

tarbucks exemplifies a location that outwardly
reveals a lack of identity and so conforms to the
category of site. Negative qualities associated with
Starbucks are invariably bound to its apparent indifference as to what it contains at any given moment.
“To be in place is to be sheltered and sustained by
its containing boundary” (p. 186), writes Casey.
In Starbucks, shelter appears prima facie discounted by the absence of particular containment.
Instead, one becomes intuitively aware of a location
that undergoes (and aspires to) the mere semblance
of containment.
In turn, this sense of ‘obligated inclusion’ is
likely to have the opposite effect—i.e., to invoke
repulsion. Nevertheless, there is a risk that this outright dichotomy between repulsion and attraction
will harvest a partial perspective. As a result, the
possibility of the site being both memorable and
intimate is apparently lost.
Arguably, the resistance against regarding a site
as being memorable owes its origin to the myth of
Simonides. According to Yates’ account, a memorable place tends to be both varied and sequentially
related. Arranging a ‘loci’ in a defined order, says
Yates (1966, pp. 22-23), enables memory to be retrieved with greater ease.
Inversely, a lack of spatial variation is likely to
breed confusion and forgetfulness. In a labyrinth,

*****

ut what if one considers the role that site plays
in securing intimacy rather than undermining
it? It is often said that certain places are all the
same. One of the unashamedly non-distinguishing
features of a place (if the term can be used in an informal sense) like Starbucks is that it remains the
same despite its spatial location. Orientation and
continuity are afforded in a foreign city by knowing
what qualities imbue the coffee house in advance.
Against the backdrop of unfamiliarity, familiarity is
conceived as the indissoluble motifs and identical
pastel colors of Starbucks are encountered.
In such a situation, we can pretend to be anywhere while simultaneously being somewhere. So
long as the outside remains excluded, Starbucks aspires to universality in its interior spatiality.
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tivity that is often conferred upon it. Part of the resistance felt by those who refuse to frequent Starbucks often involves the belief that it strives to the
status of a traditional (where traditional usually
means ‘bohemian’) coffee house but instead
emerges as a sterilized artifice. The employment of
implicitly organic features such as ethnic art, earthly
colors, recycled napkins, and dark laminated floorboards, rather than mirror the earthly origins of the
coffee bean, only emphasizes this tension between
particularity and mass-produced affectation.
Even if this claim is correct—and its validity is
largely extraneous here—then the standardization of
a place does not serve to undermine the memories
that evade that homogeny. As Casey (1987, p. 190)
suggests, “it is just one more lot to look at, and a
such it is distinctly unmemorable.”A site that obtains meta-depth instead subverts the lack of temporal depth originally provoked by artificial features
by rendering those features temporal in themselves.

very little is remembered, and disorientation is
gained as one dead end meets another. Further, a
place that fails to house obvious distinctions will
lose sequentiality and instead promote uniformity.
That uniformity lessens the potential for memorability is logical insofar as memorable place relies
on “distinct potencies” to preserve memory. A multiplicity of diverse attributes might well furnish a
place with the means to house memory. Bachelard
(1964, p. 8) writes: “if the house is a bit elaborate…
our memories have refuges that are all the more
clearly delineated.”
This does not entail, however, that an indistinct
location is unmemorable and so devoid of intimacy.
On the contrary: what it implies is that memorability relies not on “distinct potencies” determined by
the natural unfolding of lived experience but rather
by the cultivated and essentially contrived appearance of lived experience.
Thus, distinct particularization suffers a loss of
actuality and instead is replaced by standardization
and a sense of either implied or otherwise unlived
experience. In turn, it is the cultivation itself, being
essentially vacuous, which provides a platform for
new memories to be conceived. Accordingly, the
object of cultivation acquires a depth despite its apparent lack of intended temporal depth. In effect, it
is a meta-depth.

P

C

*****

entral to both Bachelard and Casey is the notion that the particularity of place is instrumental in developing, in Casey’s terms (1987a, p. 186)
“points of attachment” or, in Bachelard’s terms
(1964, p. 8), “countless alveoli” that allow memory
to be contained and so retrieved.
For Casey, variegations and obtrusions on the
landscape define it in a positive fashion. Through
encountering them, we are said to be “slowed down,
stopped, or in some other way caught-in-place”
(1987a, p. 198). Becoming attentive to place is
brought about by a distinction between background
and foreground.
This is equally true of ‘accidental’ obtrusions. In
the shopping mall, we are likely to remember the
disabled elevator because it caused us inconvenience through thwarting our progress. What implicates an object being memorable is the context in
which it finds itself. The elevator individuates itself
from the background through countering the movement of the shopping mall.
This dynamic that allows an object to become
memorable through obtruding the landscape is foreshadowed in Heidegger’s analysis of the everyday
tool. For Heidegger, everyday usage with things determines a particular type of knowledge. Yet, so

*****

henomenologically, this affirmation of the site’s
potential for intimacy needs to be distinguished
from what might be called a post-modern ironization of site. A kitsch interaction with a location,
confining itself to a celebration of surface appraisal
alone, fails to countenance the possibility of that
location’s becoming anything more than mere diversion. Against the threat of a supposedly insipid
form, kitsch appears to disarm standardization by
ironically affirming it.
Hence: that which threatens to supplant the particularity of place is willed to emerge preemptively.
As such, it is a pernicious strategy that evinces a
passive form of aggressive resistance against site in
the hope that the ‘siteness’ of the site will be overthrown by an ironic domestication of it.2
The idea that site is limited by a homogenous
lack of depth might well explain the inherent nega-
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right. This inversion of variegations is realized in
that sites produce not convex ‘points of attachment’
but, rather, entirely concave geometrical hollows.

long as things remain in use, they remain undiscovered: “A totality of useful things is always already
discovered before the individual useful thing” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 64). The everyday world of things
conceals itself within in a complex relationship between the assignment of usability and the production of that usability.

T

I

*****

f site is universal by dint of lacking particular
content and so indifferent to us, then when that
site is rendered intimate, an ambiguity between
these divisions is the necessary result. Thus, until it
is imbued with lived experience, site remains outside us, homogenous, universal and for Casey
(1987a, p. 190) “even inimical.”
Yet, in the experience of conferring a metadepth upon the site, a tension is created between
subjective experience and the objective status of
that site. Site and place appear to have converged,
yet the convergence is vague because site remains
as site while place maintains its distance.
Unlike place, memory does not therefore remain
fixed definitely as “fossilized duration concretized”
(Bachelard, 1964, p. 8). Rather, it shifts in between
states of clarity. Moreover, since site itself is framed
by a lack of particular distinction, experience which
took place in site is never definite. This is realized
in that site is not, in Casey’s words, a place-holder
for memories. Instead, memory resides dynamically—the relationship between the contained and
the container prone to mutability, not rigidity.
Transposing Bachelard’s topoanalytic investigation of the house onto the site, we would therefore
be required to be just as heedful to detail. Since
sites are easily confused, the nuances that individuate one site from another do so resonantly. Marginal
details, hitherto dismissed, assume a significance
that is realized in their immediate but otherworldly
intimacy. If it is a specific parking lot we remember
but find ourselves in a different city, even in a different country, then we are likely to notice precisely
what renders one lot different from the other.
The individuation is subtle, but because of that
subtlety the difference is experienced more forcefully. In the wide expanse of empty site, universality
and particularity thus compound. In doing so, memory, not only assumed to have existed by means of
affectation or physical ornament, is emplaced in a
space of ambiguous homogeneity.

*****

hus, a thing is ‘conspicuous’ when it has subverted the “associations in which we use it” and
instead disclosed itself “in a certain unhandiness”
(p. 68). This subversion manifests primarily itself in
the damage or absence of that thing. On the one
hand, a damaged thing withdraws from use and so
forces us to consider its unhandiness. As a result of
this unhandiness, ‘objective presence’ paradoxically
makes itself known. On the other hand, the absence
of things causes us to be heedful to the space in
which that thing was to be placed. Moreover, the
greater that thing is sought, then the more objectively present it becomes “such that it seems to lose
the character of handiness” (p. 69).
Through being removed from a given context, a
presence is created in the space of absence which in
turn constitutes an obtrusion. This is a significant
point that highlights a basic shortcoming of Casey’s
account of content-dominated variegation. Whereas
Casey speaks of variegation in terms of an obtruded
presence (consummately, the “erection of a distinctive house upon…an indifferent building lot”
[1987a, p. 186]), Heidegger’s analysis demonstrates
that diversity and disruption are also characterized
by negation and absence too.
Not only does the absence constitute a “breach
in the context of references” (1996, p. 70), but it
also disrupts the pre-mediated totality of things, so
far conditioned by handiness: “But with this totality,” Heidegger (1996, p. 70) writes, “world makes
itself known.” Transferring this totality to the apparent conflict between place and site, it is evident
that points of attachment need not involve a logic of
content and presence.
Often, being slowed down or otherwise becoming attentive to our surroundings manifests in terms
of what is missing from that landscape. Thus, in the
space of the site, it is the very ‘leveling down’ of
variegation that constitutes a presence in its own
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confesses: “Welcome! A Starbucks coffee shop is a
special place. But most of all, it’s your place.”
2. Furthermore, while site and ‘non-place’ (particularity Marc Augé’s treatment [1995] of non-place)
share obvious similarities in their lack of temporal
depth, their distinction ought to be maintained.

*****

n this essay, I have sought to demonstrate that
place need not hold a monopoly on memorability
and that, through resisting place’s ‘points of attachment’, site instead creates an inverted hollow that is
able to contain memory. In turn, this renders site
intimate, particular, and yet simultaneously vague.
That this vagueness might constitute a more accurate representation of the past, being essentially
fragmented rather than complete, is a question that
begets further speculation. Nonetheless, as the urban landscape beckons to become ever more homogenized, resistance against this change opens
itself to the dangers of a nostalgic idealization of
static place. If site, in its unflinching ambiguity, can
evoke a non-fixed image of space, then it will have
already proved its power through contesting the
dominancy of place.
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Notes
1. That local art is hung on the otherwise identical
walls means that each Starbucks can vary sufficiently to warrant being distinct without wholly
subverting the recognized formula. The presence of
localized attributes (a Starbucks in Brighton Beach,
Brooklyn, has Russian menus and chess tables to
accommodate the large Russian community) has the
effect of generating the impression of Starbucks being a place rather than a site. As the official website
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Now there was a dilemma—really, the basic
existential dilemma of our embodied finitude. Shall
I live here, in this life? Or there, in that one? Two
possible futures, and the responsibility of choosing
one. But which one? We know our lives will be different depending on which fork we take on the path,
but we cannot know beforehand the difference. So
we are “condemned to choose” precisely when we
do not know what we want. As the Greeks long ago
recognized, we remain in this “all too human” trap
as long as we are ignorant of who we really are.
Instead of choosing blindly, I did what I learned
to do in such situations: wait and see. I would ask
many others, “Which would you choose?” They
would tell me, “This one” or “That one” without
really convincing me.
Then, one day, a wise old Cajun walked the land
with me. When I asked him, “Where?” he replied,
not by picking one site or the other, but by noting:
“If you choose the higher ridge, you will build the
home for your outward looking self. If you choose
the ridge beside the future lake, you will build the
home for your inward looking self.”
At that moment, I could see both “selves”
clearly, and these “sites of vision” forcefully clarified who I was. I also saw myself in a developmental perspective: I had lived forty years mostly cultivating my “outward looking self.” It was time, divorced and at mid-life, to devote the next stage to
nurturing my “inward looking self.” It was time for
this inward turn, time to sit by the lake. I would not
lose the ridge top view. It would be the spot to
which I would walk to have my breath taken away,
savoring that place precisely because it would not
become inhabited and habituated.

irst came the place. After searching for land
on which to build my dream home, I finally
found a property of 20 acres that was just
right. Heavily wooded, subtended by a granite shelf
laced with veins of quartz crystal, a portion of a
much larger hardwood forest, my site included the
requisite swiftly flowing river and a meandering,
spring-fed stream punctuated by waterfalls.
It was not, however, the “parts” that compelled
the conclusion that this was the spot, for the “parts”
never do quite make up the “whole.” Rather, I think
it was the way the rolling hills palpably undulated
the first time I walked this land that persuaded me
this was my spot. Validating that conclusion was an
old Indian marker tree—a large oak that, in its
youth, had been deliberately bent horizontal and
then again vertical. Yes, this was a powerful place.
But building the house would wait an unexpectedly long time and afford many decisions and revisions. First, where to build? With so much beautiful
land, I could choose from several sites. One had
early on caught my fancy on the far edge of the
third ridge in, near the Indian marker tree, with a
270 degree panorama of the river valley 200 feet
below.
As I came nearer to building, however, I realized the small stream would need to be dammed so
that a driveway could traverse the first ridge nearest
the road. But imagining the small lake the dam
would make, I now became interested in an alternative building site: the second ridge overlooking the
lake. This site was only an acre but would nestle
between tall trees on either hillside while opening
up a vista of sky in the otherwise thick forest.
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Seeing My Site

streambed would have to be cut down—trees and a
lake just cannot co-inhabit the same spot. While I
had found a way to wind the course of my driveway
around the tall trees, sparing every one, here there
could be no compromise: these trees would have to
die, for the sake of my house.
It was shocking to watch two men with chainsaws and bulldozer massacre the trees in one day.
The slaughter was horrific and, at day’s end, with
the beginning of an earthen dam starting to back up
muddy water over the site of devastation, I felt
heartrendingly sad. All I could do was to take responsibility for what I had done, by sitting with the
felled trees, being with them as they died. I could
feel their suffering as twilight settled around us.
And then the lesson. It was the frogs who taught
me. They quickly found this expanding pool of new
water, and arrived by the dozens, maybe the hundreds, and began to sing, to celebrate the appearance of this new watery wonderland! And here, before my eyes, was the old lesson of Shiva: that destruction and creation were two halves of the same
wheel, always turning upon itself. Living in the forest since then has given me innumerable instances
of this profound truth.

When it came time to build, a further “siting” had to
be made. Now it became imperative to set the veritable stakes into the ground: to actually demarcate
the “footprint” of the house on the land. More
choosing! Should the house sit higher up the ridge,
or farther toward the tip end? And exactly what angle would the house have toward the little lake, itself still only a figment of the imagination?
How to know? By an act of “emplacing” myself
into the “virtual house”–and seeing how it felt to be
“there.” How does the land beneath this spot feel?
How do the trees surround this one? Where is the
sun? The wind? The sound of the stream, running
over the rocks? Husserl described the task of phenomenological analysis as requiring acts of “empathy” with imaginal, or virtual experiences, and this
is what I attempted. I employed the skills I had
learned as a phenomenologist to “find” where my
house was by virtually inhabiting it.
But it wasn’t only the house that had to be
sited. Next came the driveway. It was “raw” land
after all—a hardwood forest that had been undisturbed for generations. The house was to be about
800 feet in from the road, so cutting a driveway
through the woods would be the first “gash” to this
ecology. It felt analogous to the strange sense of
violation that must have accompanied the first surgical incision.
The challenge was to find a path so closely following the contours of the land it would be at home
there and not washed away by the natural forces of
erosion that otherwise would tend to close that dehiscence, much as the body heals its own wounds.
Again, this task was greatly aided by an “empathic
immersion” in the roll of the land coursing, like water, over its swells and around the large trees.
A particular challenge was the gap between the
first ridge, nearer the road, and the second ridge, on
which the house would be built. The drop and rise
in elevation was too much for a driveway, so the
driveway’s lowest point would have to be built up.
But a lovely small stream eddied its way along
the floor of this small valley. So, to bridge these two
ridges would require an earthen dam spanning them,
and the stream would be backed up to form a lake.
Of course, the tall old oaks along either side of that

Building My Home
I had an overall design idea in mind. Indeed, it had
been “in my mind” long before I had even seen the
land. I had long dreamed of a house that would be a
Victorian style—a real “painted lady” with lots of
gingerbread trim, turrets and towers and such. But
now, facing my spot here in my woods, I realized
quite definitively that this dream house was not the
house that this spot called for. Such a house would
be an interloper never at home.
I began all over again, asking this place what
sort of house would be “at home.” I did my best to
empty my mind to see what might belong. Slowly at
first, then faster, a house came into view—with unpainted, cypress siding that would weather naturally
from golden brown to the soft grey of the surrounding trees, until the building would so blend into its
surround that one would have to almost run into the
house before seeing it.
And lots of windows, large ones, with no dividers. French style and pivoting open to give untram-
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Spaces Within

meled views of the woods. Ceilings a little higher
than usual, to give airiness and space, within the
vaulting trees outside. A two-story house that would
provide the most area for the smallest footprint, nestling midst the trees without dominating them. The
surrounding oaks would encompass the house, embracing and including it within their world.
It would be essential that as few as possible be
cut. With great care, we saved several large ones
within a few feet of the house. Most builders would
have said, “Take them out, they’re just going to die
anyway.” Treated with care, however, they didn’t.
There was one, particularly near the house, a
lovely double trunked old white oak. Almost everyone said it would die and should be cut down.
Deeply torn, I asked one very old local what he
thought. After standing silently before it for a few
minutes, he replied, “It’s got a long and deep tap
root. It’ll be fine.” I kept it. He was right.
As for the design of the house itself, I again did
my best to proceed phenomenologically. I placed
myself within my imagined house, and anticipated
how each room would unfold around me, how it
would “feel” to be “there.” These repeated acts of
“experiential imagining” brought forward the house
in its virtuality, and it was with this “virtual house”
that I worked to refine and clarify its design.
For example, wanting the house to be as intrinsically connected with its place as possible, I was
sensitive to the essence of “layers” and gradations
between “inside” and “outside.” I pictured a porch
wrapping around the front and an upstairs balcony,
both of which were “outside layers of the inside.”
Next, on one side, a sun room—a warm, enclosed
space with walls of windows on three sides and
filled with plants. With a floor of rougher wood, this
room would be filled with wicker furniture and help
shape the “inside layer of the outside.”
In short, there was to be no sharp dualism between inside and outside but, rather, a continuum of
interconnectedness even manifested by the front
door, which, already set back within the front porch,
marked the transition between the “inside layer of
the outside” and the “outside layer of the inside.” A
solid oak door but with a long centered oval glass
and long, narrow flanking transom windows.

Next, the interiority itself. The front door opened
onto a foyer, a small square area to provide a further
transition between inside and outside but now on
the “inside of the inside.” Bordered by a coat closet
on one side and a small bathroom on the other, this
foyer faced a center oak staircase that was like a
waterfall of wood, flowing up and down, inward
and outward. Atop the stairs was a landing, framed
by a large window, through which the sun and trees
streamed in. The stairs led up to the trees which,
welcomed in, flowed down.
I wanted each area of the house to have its own
distinct atmosphere and each room to be its own
“lived world” of experience. In addition to making
separate rooms (rather than the now common “great
room”) I was determined to amplify these distinctive atmospheres by the use of color. The foyer,
staircase walls, and central upstairs room would be
a salmon, which invited movement into its space
and opened with ease onto the other atmospheres.
To the right of the foyer, through an open double doorway, would be the dining room, a place to
gather for spirited feasting and conversations, for
family life, romantic intimacies and friendships. For
its walls, I envisioned a dark red, softened and
warmed by a hint of brown. And trimmed in white
to evoke a depth that, particularly in candle light,
would give the room a dimensionality, of latencies
emergently subtending the manifest.
Off the side of the dining room, a narrow doorway would lead to the kitchen. Most kitchens strike
me as oppressive “work stations” where one is surrounded by equipment and storage facilities. One
too often feels trapped in a kitchen, and I wanted
exactly the opposite. My kitchen, facing south,
would open to the rolling land that undulated its
way up the long ridge.
To fashion this view, I wanted twelve-foot-wide
windows across the wall but where, then, could
cupboards be placed? The solution was to break the
kitchen into four sub-areas. An interior side, opening to the dining room, would become the “dish
pantry,” lined on both sides by cupboards and cabinets, sink and dishwasher.
An exterior side would serve for “food prep,”
accommodating a long counter top beneath the win-
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“family room” connecting the private rooms of all
the members of the house. It is the “game room”
where we come together to play.
The east upstairs wing includes the bedrooms
for my two children, both of whom participated in
the design (following appropriate instruction from
me on how to phenomenologically “emplace” themselves “in” their virtual room).
In imagining his room, my son, then six years
old, included a fireplace and a “secret doorway”
disguised as a bookcase opening on a passageway to
a secret room in the attic. He chose a bright shade of
green for his walls, much like the color of the new
leaves of the forest trees in early spring.
My daughter, then eleven, designed her room as
a suite of two spaces: an “outer” or “public” room
open to the house beyond, and an “inner” or “private” room, itself accessible only through the outer
room. In her “public” room she set up her study,
with built-in bookcases (one of which opened onto
the secret passage). Her inner room included a wall
alcove with a platform for her waterbed. This space
was also a dressing room and play room—the place
where she kept the toys and the doll house she and I
had made when she was much younger. If her study
was the place of her telos, this room was the place
of her arche. She painted her study lavender, while
she painted the inner room bright pink, her favorite
color when she was very young.
On the western wing upstairs was my bedroom,
which I designed to be infused by the image of a
favorite enclosure of my childhood—a tree house.
High off the ground, this space incorporates large
windows on three sides opening to the nearby tree
branches. I wanted to feel amidst the trees, including the old white oak saved from cutting when the
site was first prepared. I arched the shape of the
ceiling so the patter of rain would be directly overhead. The front of the room opened onto a balcony,
itself hidden into the roof of the front porch below.
On the balcony sits a hot tub—a place for relaxation
beneath the stars. Both the bedroom and the balcony
face the setting sun and moon.

dows, plus a range and second sink, both at the level
of the counter, which would be anchored at one end
by a food pantry and at the other by a cabinet enclosing the refrigerator. Here, Heidegger’s “readiness to hand” served my planning, and I arranged
for implements and ingredients to be right where
my hands would most easily find them.
I envisioned a third sub-area of the kitchen
tucked beneath the descending ceiling of the staircase and containing laundry machines, linked via
laundry chute to upstairs. Last was a small sitting
space with desktop and cookbook shelf.
Extending out from the west side of the house
would be the sun room, with three sides of windows
and linked to the woods beyond. During the half
year from May through October, the forest would
shelter this room from the hot sun but, during the
other half of the year, this room would receive the
sun’s warmth and invite sunsets into the house.
On the opposite east side of the house would be
the study. Located at the end of the hallway off the
front foyer, this space would be distantiated from
the rest of the house—a retreat and place of contemplation. I envisioned, upon entering, a nook to
the left—a wall alcove with a raised platform of
cushions and pillows, long and wide enough to recline and read. Beyond the alcove, one would enter
the main space, which is centered by a large stone
fireplace. The study is drenched in dark green and
rimmed by the dark wood of floor-to-ceiling bookcases built into the walls.
Though primarily an inward-leaning space, the
study would have a large desk looking out a south
facing window, allowing flights of fancy to the
world beyond. Behind the desk is a window seat for
an east-facing window from which, during times of
quiet reflection, I might watch the moon rise, then,
through the other window over the desk, watch the
moon move as it marks the passage of time.

Going Up
I have always preferred a two-story house to concretize the experience of going to a different level in
our nocturnal dreamscapes. The staircase in my
house leads upstairs to a center room from which,
set back by little alcoves, all the other upstairs
rooms radiate. This central space is designed to be a

Elegant, Rustic, & Whimsical
Through this project of designing and building my
dream home, I realized that there was so much more
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transition, Jung has been inspirational, but
it is Levinson (1978) who has most thoroughly explicated this significance developmentally. Concerning phenomenological
method, Husserl’s pioneering work (1962,
1970) is particularly important.
Applied spatiality, Merleau-Ponty’s
innovations (1962, pp. 98-147, pp. 243-98)
are especially valuable. With regard to the
role of the experiential in architectural design, many sources explore features of the
home, e.g.,, Lang’s insights about doors
(1984).
For a synthetic understanding, Bachelard (1964), Heidegger (1977), and Seamon
(1993) are seminal. Lastly, I heartily recommend Kohak (1984) for his profound
understanding of the place of the human in
nature. More than any other, it was this
book that guided me.

than making a structure that would be safe and efficient. More even than an intelligent design. By
imaginally placing myself as intensively as I could
into the experience of living in the house I was
building, I found the house that was to be my home.
In hindsight, I can see that there were three essential
yet implicit constituents of the experience I was
seeking to incarnate: I wanted my home to embody
a sense of elegant, rustic whimsicality. It had to be
beautiful, at ease, and playful.
While this essential structure of the “experienced home” remained implicit during its building,
by being as conscious as possible of how the design
opened a lived experience, I was able to be guided
by that virtual experience, so that the imagined
house emerged as a particular and personal experiential reality, a dream home of one’s own.
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